Essays on Political Economics and Regulation
political and electoral cycles; responsive regulation; political polarization.
This thesis is composed of three essays, two of them on political economy and the other on the economics of regulation. The first essay assesses the existence of political and electoral cycles on the provision, by mayors, of Bolsa Família resources in Brazilian municipalities between the years 2005 and 2012. In general, the electoral cycles have been very clear in the estimations, in the sense to increase the provision of Bolsa Família during election periods and when mayors can be re-elected. The second essay addresses, from the perspective of economics and with game theory instruments, the theory of responsive regulation (TRR), created within regulatory law and currently in vogue among several domestic and international regulators, as well as stimulated by manuals of good practices of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development – OECD. The essay begins with a responsive game between the regulatory authority and the regulated firm, from which lessons are drawn to be used in the proposition of a compliance pyramid adapted for Brazilian regulators, presented in the final part of the essay and which considers the legal-institutional peculiarities of the regulatory environment national. In addition to the traditional aspects of responsive regulation, the model (game and pyramid) incorporates elements from the literature on the ability to enforce concession contracts, showing that responsive mechanisms are compatible with the objective of enforcing these contracts, even in countries with lower institutional capacity. Finally, the third essay analyzes the results of the 2018 Brazilian presidential elections considering the aspects advocated in the theory of demand for populism. Characterized by a reduction in the importance of centrist candidates, high polarization and the victory of an extreme right candidate over the left party that had won the last four contests, the 2018 presidential election deviates from the general pattern of majority elections, by which candidates centrists and those with less rejection tend to be favorites in majority elections – because of the median voter theorem. The essay has captured the effects of the feeling of disillusion with traditional politics, which are hypothetically due to problems such as exposure to economic crises, migratory crises, poor indicators of public safety, among others. To avoid endogeneity problems, an instrument has been used (voting by biometrics) that isolates possible simultaneous effects of the latter on political disillusionment and in the voting of extreme candidates, seeking to maintain a robust causal relationship between disillusionment and political polarization.