Banca de QUALIFICAÇÃO: João Pedro Lang

Uma banca de QUALIFICAÇÃO de MESTRADO foi cadastrada pelo programa.
STUDENT : João Pedro Lang
DATE: 24/07/2023
TIME: 16:00
LOCAL: Vídeo Conferência
TITLE:

Voting behavior in alternating single- and multi-member elections: a gametheoretical analysis of Brazilian senatorial races

KEY WORDS:

Brazilian Senate; electoral systems; game theory; public choice; voting behavior

PAGES: 20
BIG AREA: Ciências Sociais Aplicadas
AREA: Economia
SUMMARY:

 In the Brazilian Federal Senate, each unit of the Federation (UF) elects three senators for an eight-year term, but elections happen every four years. As a result, Senate elections alternate between: a plurality system, in which the candidate who received the greatest number of votes in the UF wins, and a third of the Senate is renewed; and a multimember system, in which each voter can cast a vote for two candidates, as long as they are different candidates, the two candidates who received the most votes in the UF win, and twothirds of Senate seats are renewed. In this work, we analyze the consequences of alternating between these two electoral systems on voting behavior in the senatorial race and the consequences on how parties act, based on theoretical frameworks from game theory and public choice theory. A simple model of optimal candidate choice by voters in a onedimensional ideological spectrum predicts, for multi-member elections, that: voters may rationally vote blank or null; and parties may opt to nominate one or two candidates for the race, depending on the ideological configuration of the parties running for the election. We discuss potential paths to empirically test these propositions, as well as limitations and extensions.

COMMITTEE MEMBERS:
Externo à Instituição - MATHIEU TURGEON
Presidente - 162391 - MAURICIO SOARES BUGARIN