Banca de DEFESA: DÉBORA DIAS THOMÉ

Uma banca de DEFESA de MESTRADO foi cadastrada pelo programa.
STUDENT : DÉBORA DIAS THOMÉ
DATE: 17/12/2025
TIME: 14:00
LOCAL: Videoconferência
TITLE:

Judicial Deference: An Empirical Study within the Scope of the Federal Supreme Court on the Control of Regulatory Agencies

KEY WORDS:

Judicial Deference; Supreme Federal Court; regulatory agencies; empirical research

PAGES: 186
BIG AREA: Ciências Sociais Aplicadas
AREA: Direito
SUMMARY:

The research analyzes the degree of judicial deference granted by the Supreme Federal Court (STF) to the decisions of federal regulatory agencies in the exercise of their technical-sectoral regulatory powers. The question posed is: is there in the case law a predisposition toward deference? In the first chapter, conceptual parameters were developed. The theoretical bases were established for defining judicial deference, understood as judicial self-restraint qualified by institutional respect for these entities. The second chapter focused on analyzing the purpose, structure, and powers of regulatory agencies, as well as the judicial control of their actions. The third and final chapter was devoted to empirical research. First, a raw database was assembled, extracted through the selection of cases in which the agencies appeared as participants in the legal-procedural relationship (pure subjective criterion), added to the judgments containing discursive elements indicating the presence or absence of deference (subjective-objective criterion). Next, this universe of cases was delimited by the following methodological cutoffs: filing between 10/5/2010 and 10/5/2024; adjudication on the merits of the main issue by a published judgment; and subject matter falling within the sectoral regulatory sphere of the regulatory agency. The combination of these criteria originated the refined database. The next step consisted of classifying the judgments into three categories: deferential, interfering, and indifferent. Judgments were considered deferential in three situations: convergence of the decisions with the agencies’ actions, convergence with the agencies’ interests, and the presence of an explicit deferential discourse. Interference corresponds to the opposite hypotheses. The indifferent decision, in turn, occurs when the dispute was resolved without any reference to the regulatory agency or its regulatory activity. The result revealed the predominance of deferential decisions. It was also found that both deference and interference did not stem from automatic agreement but were preceded by judicial oversight and accompanied by justifications for intervening or not in the regulator’s choices. Thus, the data showed that within the scope of the STF, judicial deference does not imply a relinquishment of judicial control, but rather a measured judgment of self-restraint that preserves the actions of regulatory agencies without waiving the review of legality. Deference is not automatic, as in the classic Chevron Doctrine, but seeks to balance judicial control with the decision-making autonomy and regulatory authority of the regulatory agencies.

COMMITTEE MEMBERS:
Externa à Instituição - VANICE REGINA LÍRIO DO VALLE - UFG
Externo à Instituição - ABHNER YOUSSIF MOTA ARABI - USP
Interno - 1549538 - OTHON DE AZEVEDO LOPES
Presidente - 1850245 - ROBERTA SIMOES NASCIMENTO