Consensuality in the Federal Supreme Court: Challenges of Proceduralizing Consensuality in Constitutional Jurisdiction
consensual dispute resolution; Supreme Federal Court; constitutional jurisdiction; proceduralization; mediation; conciliation
This dissertation analyzes the process of institutionalizing consensuality within the Federal Supreme Court, with an emphasis on the challenges related to its proceduralization in the context of constitutional jurisdiction. It starts from the observation that, in recent decades, the Brazilian justice system has undergone significant transformations, marked by the growing appreciation of consensual mechanisms for dispute resolution, which have been incorporated as judicial policy. In this context, the Federal Supreme Court has progressively adopted institutional structures aimed at promoting self-composition, such as the Mediation and Conciliation Center (CMC), the Alternative Dispute Resolution Center (CESAL), and the Consensual Conflict Resolution Unit (NUSOL).The research investigates the extent to which the normative evolution of these structures represents an effective process of proceduralizing consensuality, understood as the establishment of institutional rules capable of organizing the conduct of negotiations within the Court. To this end, a qualitative methodology is employed, based on documentary and normative analysis, with a comparative examination of the acts that created such mechanisms, in light of analytical categories such as initiation criteria, definition of participants, procedural stages, forms of record-keeping, and mechanisms of institutional control.The results indicate that, although there has been progress in the institutionalization of consensuality within the Federal Supreme Court, this movement has not been matched, to the same extent, by the definition of clear, structured, and uniform procedures. There is a prevalence of open-ended rules and a significant degree of discretion in the conduct of consensual practices, which may undermine the predictability, transparency, and legitimacy of these initiatives.It is concluded that consensuality, within the framework of constitutional jurisdiction, presents significant potential as a complementary instrument for resolving complex disputes, especially those of a structural nature. However, its effectiveness depends on the development of an institutional model that balances flexibility and proceduralization, ensuring legal certainty and democratic oversight of negotiation practices.