Banca de DEFESA: Lucas Almeida Couto

Uma banca de DEFESA de MESTRADO foi cadastrada pelo programa.
STUDENT : Lucas Almeida Couto
DATE: 18/07/2023
TIME: 10:00
LOCAL: IPOL
TITLE:

Pre-Electoral Coalitions and Government Formation in Presidentialism

KEY WORDS:

Coalitional Presidentialism, Conditional Logit Analysis, Latin America, Pre-Electoral Coalitions, Presidential Cabinets, Presidentialism, QCA

PAGES: 103
BIG AREA: Ciências Humanas
AREA: Ciência Política
SUMMARY:

This dissertation assesses which conditions enable the transition of pre-electoral coalitions into coalition governments in Latin American presidential regimes through a multimethod research design. Even though most literature praises the fact that pre-electoral coalitions exert a non-negligible impact on government formation in presidentialism, I present a nuance to this relationship by arguing that pre-electoral coalitions are not automatically transformed into coalition cabinets in presidentialism. This is so because of the nature of presidential institutions, which grants presidents the opportunity to revise the pre-electoral agreement once they hold office at the same time that diminishes the extent to which pre-electoral coalition members can punish them. Against this backdrop, the first empirical paper puts forward and tests the claim that pre-electoral pacts should be more binding to the extent that legislative polarisation is more pervasive in the party system. The reason is that an increased ideological dividedness at the party system level reduces presidents’ margins to build coalition cabinets not based on the pre-electoral pact, as complexity bargaining hampers the presidential ability to assemble parties with conflicting policy preferences in the same cabinet. In addition, based on a configurational rationale, the second empirical paper investigates what makes pre-electoral coalitions serve as the foundations of post-electoral coalition cabinets, given that pre-electoral commitments can be enlarged, maintained or shrunk until the government’s inauguration day. The results highlight the importance of five conditions, albeit with more prominence for the pre-electoral coalition majority status, the low polarisation between pre-electoral coalition members and the high legislative polarisation. Taken together, the findings of this dissertation enlarge our knowledge of the relationship between pre-electoral coalitions and government formation in presidentialism by showing its entanglement with legislative polarisation.

COMMITTEE MEMBERS:
Externo à Instituição - RAIMONDAS IBENSKAS
Presidente - 1421282 - ADRIAN NICOLAS ALBALA YOUNG
Interno - 1316309 - ANDRE BORGES DE CARVALHO
Interno - 3055775 - FREDERICO BERTHOLINI SANTOS RODRIGUES