Banca de DEFESA: Gabriel Coelho Squeff

Uma banca de DEFESA de DOUTORADO foi cadastrada pelo programa.
STUDENT : Gabriel Coelho Squeff
DATE: 22/09/2023
TIME: 10:00
LOCAL: IPOL
TITLE:

Party ideology, productive structure, and income distribution in Latin America in the 2000s

KEY WORDS:

party idelogy, executive-legislative relations, productive structure, structural heterogeneity, Latin America, pink tide, income distribution, income inequality, Bolivia, Brazil, Uruguay

PAGES: 194
BIG AREA: Ciências Humanas
AREA: Ciência Política
SUMMARY:

Latin American countries experienced a significant reduction in income inequality in the 2000s due to the electoral victories by leftist presidential candidates. Although rich, the literature on the subject has at least three deficiencies: widespread adoption of Eurocentric theories, excessive focus on the ideology of the president, and disregard of the role of the productive structure.
This research addresses these three shortcomings through a parsimonious and effectively Latin American political-economy approach. Using mixed methods research, I seek to answer the following questions: 1) What is the relationship between productive structure, party ideology and total income distribution in Latin America in the 2000s? 2) Why were some Latin American countries governed by left-wing parties more successful than others in reducing total income inequality in the post-2000 period?
The theoretical model is developed in accordance with the two components of total income, namely primary income and government transfers. The main element of the first component is the income from production, addressed here through ECLAC’s structural heterogeneity approach. For government transfers, I used the theoretical contributions of power resource theory, the debate about the partisan powers of the president, and the literature that discusses the impact of the ideological difference of the chief executive vis-à-vis the average ideology of the Chamber of Deputies. Therefore, I called this theoretical approach the IPI model (I for inequality, P for productive and I for ideology).
The first question was evaluated using descriptive statistics and panel data econometrics for 14 Latin American countries between 2000 and 2020. These estimates strongly support the DPI model, namely: (i) the more left-wing the president's ideology, (ii) the more left-wing the average ideology of the Chamber of Deputies, (iii) the smaller the share of the population employed in low labor productivity activities, (iv) the larger the share of the population employed in intermediate labor productivity activities and, finally, (v) the larger the left-wing caucus in the Chamber of Deputies, the lower total income inequality in Latin America.
The second research question was addressed through case studies from a historical-institutional perspective. The experiences of Bolivia, with Evo Morales of the Movimiento al Socialismo - MAS, Brazil, with Lula and Dilma of the Partido dos Trabalhadores - PT, and Uruguay, with Tabaré Vázquez and José Mujica of the Frente Amplio - FA, were discussed in detail. Data from some social protection policies, the real minimum wage and the share of manufacturing in the Gross Domestic Product were incorporated into the IPI model.
While in the MAS and FA governments there was a left-wing ideological convergence between the Executive and Legislative branches, in the PT governments the Chamber of Deputies remained dominated by right-wing parties. Similarly, the parties of Bolivia and Uruguay managed to form one-party governments, with more than half of the total seats in the Chamber of Deputies and a large left-wing caucus. In Brazil, the PT's share has always been less than 20\% and the left-wing caucus has never been a majority, which therefore required the formation of a multi-party coalition that resulted in an ideologically heterogeneous government.
In the same vein, and largely as a result of these peculiarities, Bolivia and Uruguay have managed to substantially change their productive structures. There has been a significant reduction in the population employed in low-productivity economic activities and, conversely, an increase in higher-productivity activities. In Brazil, on the other hand, this change was much smaller and therefore much less conducive to a path of economic growth with income distribution.
Therefore, tackling income inequality was much more favorable for Morales, Vázquez and Mujica than for Lula and Dilma. When the president and m

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