This thesis examines the philosophical trajectory of Jean-François Lyotard’s work from 1954 to 1974, culminating in Libidinal Economy, to analyze how his critique of ideology evolves in dialogue with Marxism, structuralism, phenomenology, hermeneutics, and Freudian psychoanalysis. Central to this investigation is the argument that Lyotard’s proposal of a libidinal economy fundamentally reconfigures Marx’s concept of ideology as “false consciousness” or a veil masking social contradictions. By tracing Lyotard’s engagement with ideological debates—from his early critiques of political instrumentalization to his later emphasis on desire, intensities, and the materiality of capitalism—the study demonstrates how the libidinal framework destabilizes the binary logic of concealment/revelation inherent in classical Marxist theory. Instead, Lyotard reimagines capitalism as an “ephemeral skin” with no hidden interior, rendering ideology not a distortion of reality but a dynamic force within a network of affective and economic flows. Through interdisciplinary analysis, the thesis contends that Lyotard’s libidinal turn demands a radical rethinking of ideology’s role, shifting from critique of alienation to an exploration of the desiring mechanisms that sustain and disrupt social structures.

In this paper we seek to present Feuerbach's philosophy of sensibility, developed from the critique of philosophical and religious conceptions that depreciate nature and corporeality, denying essential aspects of human existence. The philosophy of sensibility, based on the unrestricted defense of love for humanity and fraternity among men, is then presented as an alternative to the conceptions of the world and of human beings that prevent them from achieving a fuller existence. The purpose of this dissertation is, therefore, to bring to light the essential aspects of Feuerbach's ethics, based on the categories of sensibility and love, which implicitly or explicitly underlie and permeate all of his academic production.

This thesis is concerned with an investigation about how the experiences of belief and disbelief occur in the novel The brothers Karamazov by Fyodor Dostoevsky, from topics as faith, atheism and redemption. This analysis was carried out taking into account that each of these topics can be better understood through each brother’s way of life, to talk about faith, we talk to Alieksiêi, when the subject is atheism, we turn to Ivan, and finally, it is Dmitri who presents us with the case of redemption. Alongside these topics are concepts that are fundamental to understanding religious experience and faith, as well as disagreement with it. In this way, together with the philosopher Luigi Pareyson, we seek to analyze concepts such as freedom, good and evil, which relate to the ideas represented by the Karamazov brothers. We work in this way in order to understand how Dostoevsky chose to deal with the conflict between faith and an atheism based on the primacy of rationality, using a religious artistic and conceptual background to oppose a strongly rationalist and scientific modern mentality.

This dissertation investigates the institution of the poetic lie in Nietzsche’s philosophy. By poetic lie we understand a discourse based on artistic artifices (metaphors) that problematize the semantic function of language. As the study’s central arguments, we defend: i- the institution of the poetic lie in Nietzsche’s philosophy does not refer to a critique of the logical- speculative character of language, i.e., the foundations of knowledge, but has specific aesthetic approach, namely: enabling reflection on language freed from the referential function; ii- the poetic lie in Nietzsche is not opposed to the truth, but presents itself as a manifestation of a certain “linguistic skepticism”; iii- linguistic skepticism would be, then, one of the keys to understand the lie as poetic language based on metaphor, in Nietzsche. Following these theoretical coordinates, the first chapter brings contextualization of the research object, in which we present the problem of the lie in Nietzsche Studies, based on the analysis of the unpublished essay On Truth and Lie in an Extramoral Sense (WL). In our view, these interpretations compete: i- the first, hegemonic, conceives the lie (appearance, deception, falsehood, illusion) as an impulse of the human being necessary for knowledge (therefore, “true”) that would imprison metaphor in the realm of language; ii- in contrast, interpretations such as the researcher Claus Zittel’s, on whom we are based, defend the self-referential, relational, challenging character of language’s semantic function present in the metaphor. Having recomposed the Nietzsche Studies debate on metaphor interpretations in WL, we perform our interpretation of the institution of the poetic lie in this essay through the following guiding thread: the poetic lie – a discourse based on the metaphors of the liar/poet/artist – destabilizes the conventions disciplined by concepts, a fundamental strategy for what we call linguistic skepticism. Poetic lie is based on a conception of metaphor that overcomes the classic dichotomy between literal and figurative meaning. Once the poetic lie in WL has been interpreted, we move on to Human, All Too Human (MA). Through intertextuality, we continue the investigation on the institution of the poetic lie in MA along with the premise of the advances in the notion of metaphor and on linguistic skepticism in WL (chapter 1). In the central argument, we highlight that the formula of the artist/poet as deceiver, in these works, are “bridges” (metaphors) for the discussion of the lie in Greek poetics, with emphasis on these characteristics: i- the ambiguity of the relationship between “truth” and “lie” in poetic discourse tradition; ii- the emphasis on the literary representation of métis (deity that subsidized the Greek imagination around cunning, intelligence, cleverness, magic) of the artist/poet in the ability to tell stories, to narrate myths; III- deception as an artistic dimension of language that accentuates the crisis of semantic primacy. Our research on the institution of the poetic lie as discourse that questions the semantic primacy of language points to the pertinence of considering skepticism in the context of the crisis of language, assumed by Nietzsche throughout practically all of his philosophy.

The following dissertation deals with the relationship between philosophical practice and the legacy of racism. My central argument is that the inescapability of the racial event inexorably alters Philosophy, both in its history (before or after colonial action in Africa and the Americas) and in the most relevant propositions of its practice. In the first chapter, which is more methodological in nature, I attempt to align the concepts that seek to establish a dialogue - hauntology, geontology, cosmopolitics, and the black radical tradition - to adduce the ineffable link between Metaphysics and raciality. The second chapter deals with the category of subject and the notion of humanity since colonization to explain that Politics and Metaphysics are intertwined in the configuration of the cosmos that supports them and, given the context in which the modern subject was erected, the non-white subject is its foundation par excellence as Non-Being. In the third and final chapter I propose a post-metaphysics based on a discussion about love, from which emerges the concept of spectral love as a counter-colonial strategy.

This dissertation investigates the logical development of spiritual determinations, focusing specifically on the initial stages of the spirit, whether subjective or objective, according to Hegel’s philosophy. Reflecting on such considerations, it is essential that the relationship between the absolute idea and naturalness is considered, since initially this product of Logic is faced with a naturalness permeated by externality. Thereby, we will follow the natural scope - constituted by the independence of its elements - advancing towards subjectivity and life. The result of this negative progress is the spirit, which despite having its origin in nature, is its truth and its first principle. This research endeavors to analyze the first moment of spiritual exercise, that is, the soul. Thus, the spirit is in its immediate form as soul, its characteristic conceptual plasticity allows it to ideally place the particularities of feeling, which significantly influence its psychic realization. Thanks to the negative conceptualization of determinations, the soul will move from an undifferentiated universality to reflection upon itself, becoming consciousness. The same logical progress can be seen in the Philosophy of law, more specifically in the abstract concept of free will. Therefore, we will follow how dialectical action encompasses the different conceptions of freedom that are explored by the philosopher in his argument. In this way, we will seek to show the logical parallels that constitute the foundation of the objective spirit and consequently establish a similarity with the progression examined in the subjective beginning.

This work reinterprets the relationship between Hegel and Marx as a basis for addressing the possibility of a Latin American philosophy. Its interpretative thread is the significance of conquest and the process of colonization in the genesis of the formation of relations between capitalism and modernity, as reflected in Marx's encyclopedic commentary on the historical figure of Simón Bolívar and the historical experience of the insurrectionary war of Spanish-American independence. It reviews the abundant interpretations that problematize the reception/translation of Marxism within the philosophical-political horizon of Latin America, not only from the perspective of the relationship between Marx and Bolívar, but also those of Hegel and Bolívar, thus producing a new approach that allows for the encounter between revolutionary and critical traditions. The key point for my interpretation is the popular national content of the Bolivarian historical experience, demonstrating that the processes of national liberation in Latin America against the colonial domination of European metropolises consummate the dialectical method in its articulation with the systematized and implemented material for addressing the formation of capitalism in the colonial periphery. Thus, I consider the links between dialectics as a critical method of exposition and its object as an unfinished process in its economic and political dimensions. In this sense, one can formulate some elements for a hypothesis of reading the relations between Hegel and Marx as an articulation of Marxism with the Bolivarian project, emphasizing, as the core of the encounter, the anticolonial character as the foundation of the critique of the objectivity of value present in the relations between the State and civil society, viewed from the perspective of its negativity in the face of the civilizing becoming in the colonial periphery of capitalism.

This study examines the term “state of exception” in Agamben’s work, distinguishing it from various reductive interpretations to broaden understanding beyond contentious historical and juridical analyses. By thematizing obscurity, we initiate our approach by focusing on the foundation of Agamben’s philosophical inquiry: its methodological dimension, which inherently advances a critique of the Western metaphysical tradition. Subsequently, the objective shifts to reconstructing the concept of exception through the interplay between political and biopolitical dimensions of power. This framework reveals the state of exception as a complex, multifaceted phenomenon, emphasizing the significance of human quality within the rule as an underlying factor in the genesis of power. Finally, amid the abrupt emergence of the overwhelming singularity of the COVID-19 pandemic, we follow Agamben in analyzing the extraordinary biopolitical strategies that arose–marked by political and institutional tensions over bodily governance. These strategies reconfigured power relations and subjectivities, destabilized modern democratic power structures, and substantiated the formulation of a destituent power.

This dissertation investigates how Hildegard of Bingen (1098–1179) articulates, in her works Scivias and Liber Divinorum Operum, a theological anthropology that positions the feminine as an active principle in the interaction between the human microcosm and the divine macrocosm. Through an analysis of Hildegard’s vision of humanity as imago Dei, in which body, soul, and reason reflect cosmic harmony, this study demonstrates how the abbess rehabilitates the feminine as an ontological dimension through figures such as Sapientia and Caritas. It also explores how she proposes a reinterpretation of traditional dichotomies, such as spirit/matter and passive/active, within the context of medieval theology and elaborates an ethics of complementarity between genders, rooted in the concept of viriditas (vital force). Adopting an interdisciplinary approach that integrates theology, medieval philosophy, and gender studies, this research reveals how Hildegard reinterprets biblical narratives, particularly those of Eve and Mary, to affirm the equal dignity of the feminine. Moreover, it examines how she connects human salvation to the restoration of cosmic order and anticipates contemporary debates on integral ecology and embodied spirituality. The study concludes that Hildegardian anthropology offers an innovative relational model for the 12th century, in which the feminine not only occupies a central role but also becomes a structuring axis of the connection between the human and the divine. In this way, her work challenges both medieval theological paradigms and the patriarchal foundations of the Christian tradition.

This thesis aims to investigate the impacts of digital communication on dialogue (broad sense), from the articulation between the hermeneutic thought of Gadamer and digital communication and, therefore, the new configuration of life established by it. In order to use not only hermeneutics, but also, more broadly, Gadamer's thought as a perspective of analysis, the concept of dialogue was chosen as an interpretative key for the reading of his work, due to its explanatory power and to the ability of conferring unity to Gadamer's thought, which is based on the actualization of the Platonic unity among the good, the beautiful and the truth. Moreover, Gadamer himself in "On the Inability for Dialogue"(1972) suggests that dialogue should be understood in a more ambitious way. It is the concrete and linguistic experience not only of thought, considered the dialogue of the soul with itself, but also of language as medium, since Gadamer equates it with the concept of dialogue. Language (as medium) occurs only in dialogue (VMII: p.207). Therefore, I underline its main characteristics: it is a dialectical movement with alterity, which has the concept of play as its structure and as a way to access the ontological domain. Note also that dialogue is also related to the structure of the experience of truth, insofar as the alterity put into play can manifest itself in many ways: as person, text, art, nature, the idea of God, etc. Reflecting on dialogue will bring about the fact that we can recognize in dialogue the ethical, epistemological, and aesthetic (art) aspects. The ethical aspect relates to the need for otherness and, thus, to the concept of good. The epistemological aspect refers to the possibility of access to truth through the relationship between the word and the being. Finally, the aesthetic aspect (art) is related to the fact that beauty is considered the form of manifestation of the good (ethical aspect). In this sense, a beautiful dialogue is the possibility of common understanding ("fusion of horizons") and, therefore, in the establishment of friendship, solidarity and the formation of a sense of community. In view of this way of interpreting and organizing Gadamerian philosophy, this thesis aims to answer the question: what are the impacts of digital communication on each of these aspects of dialogue? Although Gadamerian philosophy is not known for its political agenda, Gadamer is a political and social critic of modern technique - hence the need for the "propedeutic considerations" of the thesis. Thus, this research extends and deepens the reflection on the impacts of technology on the human way of life, already outlined by Gadamer, but this time focused on digital communication. The reflection on digital communication, the object of analysis of Gadamerian philosophy, will be based on the contemporary thinking of a group of authors, among whom I highlight Byung-Chul Han, who reflects specifically on digital communication and its impact on the organization and (self)understanding of human life; Walter Benjamin, in his investigation into the technical reproducibility of the work of art; neuroscience researcher Maryanne Wolf, philosopher and social psychology researcher Shoshana Zuboff, Jaron Lanier, Nicholas Carr, Lee McIntyre, Eli Pariser and other contemporary researchers from various fields of knowledge who are investigating how digital communication has transformed us. To obtain the general objective proposed here, the thesis is organized in three chapters, which correspond to its specific objectives: "The good: the impacts of digital communication on the ethical aspect of dialogue"; "The truth: the impacts of digital communication on the epistemological aspect of dialogue" and, finally, "The beautiful: the impacts of digital communication on the aesthetic aspect of dialogue".

Science is an important form of knowledge, which has provided and still provides increments to human life and well-being. Besides this, scientific knowledge, in its current methodological configuration, has had a marked influence on philosophical thought. The reflection about the unavoidability of science and the best way to use scientific findings, preventing possible biases, is at the core of the present study. More specifically, we try to answer this question: how can science contribute to the process of increasing philosophical reflection, especially the one related to the philosophy of language in its analytical tradition? Since the impressive advances of neuroscience related to language processing, several possibilities for reflection on the philosophical consectaries of the scientific findings in this area have been made available. However, this interaction should be careful, avoiding misrepresentations and risks sometimes present in such interdisciplinary relations. It is not a trivial task to find the adequate place for science as a potential enhancer of philosophical reflection. One of the most relevant points in neurolinguistics - the branch of neuroscience applied to language - is the one that deals with the characteristics and differences in the way language is processed among children in early childhood and among young people or adults. These neurolinguistic peculiarities can be compared with some theoretical constructs of the philosophy of language. Such confrontation is not a judgment in a so-called scientific court, but rather an opportunity for a virtuous synergism. It follows that certain of the more radical philosophical approaches related to semantics do not seem to hold up well in the face of empirical findings, while others, more sophisticated and nuanced, stand out stronger. Moreover, some refined tendencies related to the theory of meaning and philosophical approaches like descriptivism and direct reference theory can be correlated and, in some ways, harmonized in the face of scientific evidence. Even some categories of a more epistemological nature, related to the apprehension of knowledge, deserve an adequate confrontation with neurolinguistics.

This thesis explores the three core pillars of Hanian philosophy: negativity, positivity, and affability. It begins by examining negativity and positivity in their economic dimensions: the former as a defender of the monadology of the private household (oikos), and the latter as the expansion of this household through the instrumentalization of the other human being, the world, and its entities. Both oppose the death of the Self – that is, the weakening of the ego or the decline of identity’s dominance. They are interpreted as narcissistic domains, insofar as they consistently exclude the singularity of the other. This exclusion occurs when economic negativity egoically seals itself within its private household, distancing itself from human alterity. It also occurs when economic positivity approaches the other and the Earth in order to transform them into resources for unrestricted production. From the second chapter onward, the thesis reconsiders negativity beyond the economic sphere – as a guardian of the Earth, corporeality, ritualization, silence, alterity, and the We, among other themes where Hanian negativity manifests a world-preserving force against the boundless positivity of capital. Affability also emerges as an anti-economic and anti-capitalist element throughout the discussion of Hanian themes. It stands as a counterimage to economy, for it refuses to privatize territory and rejects possession and the appetite for power accumulation – traits so intrinsic to capitalist positivity, which seeks to magnify its oikos.

Thomas Aquinas is one of the great representatives of Aristotelianism in the scholastic tradition, having integrated the principles of Aristotle's philosophy into Christian theology in an original way. In this study, we seek to understand the notion of voluntas in Thomas Aquinas, investigating its main sources and influences, with an emphasis on the Aristotelian tradition. The philosophy of the Stagirite constitutes the fundamental basis of Thomas's thought. However, with regard to the conception of the will (voluntas), the Angelic Doctor does not limit himself to the simple reception of Aristotelian ideas, but adapts and reworks them, integrating elements from other philosophical traditions. In view of this, we propose to answer the following question: what are the foundations of the notion of voluntas in Thomas Aquinas and to what extent does this conception approach or distance itself from Aristotelian theory? In reality, in Thomas, it is not an isolated concept of will (voluntas), but a theory that integrates and articulates multiple concepts. Understanding voluntas in Thomas requires the understanding of a general theory of action, since it is a faculty that, together with the intellect (intellectus), guides and grounds man's moral action. The notion of will (voluntas) in Thomas is broad, and the Angelic Doctor stands out for incorporating into his writings, notably, the contributions of Aristotle, Augustine and John of Damascus – a disciple of Maximus the Confessor, who is considered by some to be the precursor of the notion of will (voluntas). Thus, a clear evolution of the concept of will () can be observed, which develops from Aristotle, through the Stoic philosophers to Augustine, culminating in Thomas Aquinas. In Aristotle, the  is at the level of the sensitive faculty, being activated by reason. In Thomas, the will (voluntas) reaches the status of a superior independent faculty of the soul. In short, we propose to investigate the foundations of the notion of voluntas in Thomas, analyzing to what extent this conception approaches or distances itself from Aristotelian theory.

In his work The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn says that paradigms can be found in the classics and, since the early 19th century, also in textbooks. They mainly consist of scientific achievements that, on one hand, have become hegemonic and, on the other, have left to posterity not only theories, methods, instruments, etc. but above all puzzles—a kind of scientific problems with assured solutions and rules that determine how to reach them.
That being said, this master's thesis is based on the hypothesis that John Austin established, with his theory of speech acts, a paradigm in both the philosophy of language and linguistics that, like any paradigm, has left a set of puzzles to posterity. To confirm this hypothesis, I will attempt to (1) trace some of these puzzles, (2) examine how John Searle solves them, and (3) verify if, in many cases, Austin himself gives any indication of being at least partially aware of their existence. Nonetheless, this does not imply that I am advocating a false equivalence between philosophy, which is fiercely driven by argumentative disputes and conceptual misunderstandings, and science, which only progresses through broad consensus. I am just raising the hypothesis (to be tested in due course) that some of Kuhn's concepts, particularly the concepts of paradigm and puzzle, are useful and flexible tools that can certainly be employed in attempting to better understand the development of certain philosophical research programs such as the theory of speech acts. It is this hypothesis (not to say this compass) that will guide my interpretation of the works of Austin and Searle that I will be engaged with in this thesis.
One knows that before distinguishing verdictives, exercitives, commissives, behabitives, and expositives, Austin distinguished three more general kinds of speech acts: the locutionary acts, the illocutionary acts, and the perlocutionary acts. He did so because those first five acts are illocutionary acts, meaning that they are acts of doing something in saying something (illocutions), not just acts of saying something (locutions) or even acts of doing something by saying something (perlocutions). Both distinctions, however, undergo a significant revision in Searle's hands, who replaces Austin's verdictives, exercitives, commissives, bahabitives, and expositives with his assertives, directives, expressives, and declarations, as well as he replaces the locutionary acts with utterance acts and propositional acts. Searle also develops a theory of conditions of success (which, along with the theory of conditions of satisfaction, resembles what Austin referred to as the doctrine of the infelicities) constituted by propositional content
conditions, preparatory conditions, sincerity conditions, essential conditions, and their corresponding rules in place of the rules/conditions A.1-Γ.2. Furthermore, although agreeing with Austin that every utterance consists in performing an action, Searle contends that only a restricted class of utterances is performative, namely, those utterances that he calls “declaratives”.
In conclusion, the ultimate goal of this thesis is to demonstrate that all these changes in the theory of speech acts arise from Searle's solutions to some of the most crucial puzzles inherited from the Austinian paradigm.

This dissertation deals with authority on practical reasoning. In light of the thesis of normal justification, I investigate how legitimate authority influences reasoning by claiming to provide practical reasons, specifically concerning second-order reasons. In this sense, I analyze how a directive that epistemologically influences reasoning - but is treated as authoritatively binding - is able to serve as a reason for action. I relate this discussion to law, as it claims to guide behavior through its prescriptions and has a conceptual connection with authority. I suggest that possibly, a legal directive that functionsasasourceofevidenceprovidesreasonsthatinfluencesaliencein reasoning, that is, first-order reasons. If the law claims to provide reasons for action, it must do so by serving as a non-normative source to trigger reasons for action that were already pre-existing. Thus, what we understand as the normativity of law consists of reasons for action that were created through the mediation of law.

This research investigates the conceptual genesis of beauty through the thought of Thomas Aquinas and its relationship with goodness and truth, also called transcendentals. The first chapter treats the idea that beauty is similar to the Son as a divine person, examining how this similarity is understood through the relationship between the Image, Son, and Beauty. The discussion extends to the nature of the Son as a divine person and the relationship between the creature and Creator, highlighting the differences and similarities between the divine Word and the formation of mental images in the human soul. The second chapter explores the constituent elements of beauty, such as integrity, proportion, and clarity, which are equated with the Son. Finally, the third chapter discusses the relationship between the good and the beautiful, investigating how the good is based not only on the efficient cause but also on the formal cause, and relating the pleasure of the beautiful to divine Love, especially reflected in the human soul inclined toward the good out of love.

Bayes' Theorem, formulated in the 18th century, did not follow a continuous trajectory of development within science. For a long period, the subjectivism inherent in the inferential approach associated with this theorem limited its acceptance in major scientific journals, with subjective probability often being the target of criticism. In modern times, however, technological advancements and the consequent increase in computational processing power, among other factors, have enabled a rediscovery and appreciation of the vast applicability and robustness that Bayes' Theorem can offer for reasoning in situations of uncertainty. This work aims to explore the historical development of this theory and discuss its impact and growing success in philosophical discussions. In the first chapter, we present probability theory from a mathematical perspective, structured to provide an introductory understanding of the fundamental concepts underpinning probability theory. In the second chapter, we explore probability and statistics from the perspective of the philosophy of science, covering relevant topics with an emphasis on central themes for frequentism and Bayesianism. We hope that this exposition can contribute to a clearer understanding of the implications arising from the use of statistics in philosophical problems.

Thinking about dispositions depends greatly on how one thinks about causal relationships. The nature of dispositions brings with it a notable difficulty, since what is dispositional boils down to the ability to do what you are not doing at the moment. Dealing with this difficulty requires the theorist to attribute elements usually considered mental to these properties. However, there is an unresolved friction in this position around the concept of mind to be defended. In our view, this friction can be captured in a dilemma: accepting the analogy between the dispositional and the intentional does not imply inferring the identity between the physical and the mental if this means accepting panpsychism; however, as far as power realism is concerned, the analogy must be true. The dispositionalist who wishes to speak about the mental faces a choice: either the theorist gives up on his explanatory purposes about the mental, or he is led to admit that panpsychism is the only plausible option consistent with his dispositional realism. Our work aims to provide an intelligible appropriation of this dilemma.

A modern democracy, like all other human creations, is subject to corruption, that is, it can be negatively impacted by multiple factors in order to lose its essence. If we consider freedom, equality and secularism as fundamental pillars of democracy, corruption would be based on the deterioration of these three principles. There can be many threats to a democratic system, in this study, we will analyze how religion can jeopardize the integrity of a liberal-pluralist democracy and its fundamental values. A major difficulty lies in reconciling religious freedom with freedom of representation and participation, without religious groups occupying power to the point of threatening secularism and democracy itself, based on Nicholas Wolterstorff's and Robert Audi's discussion of religion in the public sphere and John Hick's religious pluralism.

The quantum theory developed in the first half of the twentieth century – since the works of Max Planck and other physicists such as Niels Bohr, Werner Heisenberg, J. Von Neumann and Erwin Schrödinger – presented a series of unprecedented experimental situations, which showed themselves resistant to the classical normative determination, both with regard to some laws of Newtonian physics, and with regard to fundamental categories of modern epistemology. This situation instituted in the scientific environment problems that were previously treated in a philosophical context, so that philosophers such as Karl Popper illustrated this situation by referring to it as an “epistemological crisis”, which can be read as a problem about the objectivity of the quantum theory in face of dissensions related to its completeness, the belonging or not of attributes to unobserved quantum phenomena and the unavoidable necessity to communicate experimental events in classical terms. In this context, both the so-called “analytical philosophers” and physicists sought to build epistemological theories that could handle the experimental situation without the need to resort to classical theories. However, the success of these attempts, such as R. Carnap's “double language” solution, is questionable. In this sense, some epistemologists sought to address the epistemological problems raised by quantum theory from the perspective of an update of Kant's transcendental philosophy, as an alternative solution for the evaluation of the epistemological problems of quantum theory. The present investigation is part of this updating itinerary, based on a semantic reading of transcendental philosophy, in order to make an unorthodox use of what transcendental semantics can still provide for the treatment of the problem of objectivity in quantum theory and the defense of a pragmatic dimension of this semantics with regard to applications of quantum theory in modern chemistry.

Structured into four chapters, this work presents a study on Identity and Relationship in Paul Ricoeur. Given the breadth of the theme, we place it around the work Soi-même comme un autre, with the self as a reference and the purpose of exploring its ontological status through the themes of Identity and Relationship. These themes presuppose an ontology, a way of being that, in Ricoeur, is not given immediately, as it implies following a long path. Therefore, our exposition begins with a general characterization of the philosophy of the self, in which we indicate the self of the question, we say that the understanding of this self is mediated and that its identity is said in terms of sameness and ipseity. Through specification efforts, we began to identify,
individualize and recognize the self, demonstrating that the self is personal, singularized by action and recognized in its capabilities, despite its vulnerabilities. Thus, we have a reflective and practical self, whose form of narrative and personal identity is best expressed in terms of ipseity which, given its relational nature, takes alterity and sociality into account, in a common sphere of ethics. Along this path, we sought to highlight the ontological incidences of the philosophy of the self, which can also be called strategies for approaching the self. Once this is done, we enter the ‘promised land’ with the meta prefix of metaphysics as the threshold. Next, we give voice to the metacategories Identity and Relationship, taken as notions of the history of being, interpreted and assumed by Paul Ricoeur. Finally, we deal with the alethic character of the self as a necessary truth claim about the type of being it is. We then arrive at the statement that the self is a figure of the cogito, mediated by language and action, whose identity is relational, which shows in action a fundamental way of being. Therefore, the ontology of the self is polysemic, relational and current, whose manifestations take place on an existential horizon.

This doctoral thesis, Foucault’s Critical Thought, aims to present the reasons why the philosophy of Michel Foucault can be considered, as he states, a critical history of thought, or simply, critical thought. However, even though it may be evident that the philosopher critiques a series of practices, conceptions, attitudes, and historical conditions, it is not such an easy or simple task to demonstrate how or for what purpose the critique is exercised in Foucault’s philosophy. Recognizing this situation leads to the hypothesis of this thesis, intending to understand critical thought in two stages: the first stage is to describe the notions of critique in the context of the framework of concepts mobilized by Foucault; the second stage is to interpret the interest in addressing certain themes according to a defined purpose. To accomplish this hypothesis, this thesis relies
on the use of two axes. The analytical axis serves as a descriptive method concerning the notions of critique recorded by Foucault, favoring a didactic reading; this means adopting the famous division of Foucault’s philosophy into phases: archaeology of knowledge, genealogy of power, and what is called the ‘last Foucault’ of ethical subjectivity. This thesis identifies a notion of critique corresponding to each mentioned phase: a critique of the ‘philosophy of suspicion’, a critique of the experimental procedure, and a critique as an attitude (critique) of the last phase. However, it is not enough to establish some notions of critique for a thought to be truly, critical. Therefore, the heuristic axis carries out another idea and serves another function in this thesis. The idea is to meet Foucault’s criteria and use his ‘toolbox’, addressing a set of concepts that are considered by the philosopher himself as guidelines for his way of philosophizing. The function that the heuristic axis carries out emulates an interpretative method but with the peculiarity of executing an interpretation of the way Foucault interprets his philosophy. In this case, it is possible to identify three interpretative modalities: forms of problematization, foyers of experience, and the last one that requires the effort of this thesis to be presented, the means of transformation of the self. The conclusion of this thesis points to the articulation
of these two axes to arrive at an understanding of Foucault’s critical thought that considers the notions of critique elaborated by the philosopher as well as considers the defined purposes to make his philosophy a critical thought.

This thesis presents a proposal for investigating the idea of technology through a theo- rization of artifacts, characterizing the domain of technology based on artifacts. It also offers a conception of technology as an element of virtualizing reality and explores the idea of cosmotécnica, drawing a parallel between this proposal and the outlined framework. Finally, it considers a current overview of the phenomenon of technology in its metaphysical, existential, and cultural developments, and speculates about future landscapes on the topic.

The thesis studies the argumentation about the existence of God given the background of the basicality of theistic belief. One of the central points studied is the attribution of the burden of proof, which in the debate about the existence of God is linked to the evidentialist objection to theistic belief. Aiming to neutralize the evidentialist objection, Alvin Plantinga defends the possibility of belief in God being properly basic, developing an entire theory, which is called Reformed epistemology. I explain why, although a basic belief, by definition, does not need arguments to be warranted, it is still possible to argue about it. I also defend the need for contextualization when invoking the basicality of theistic belief, as its explanatory power varies depending on whether the religious system in question emphasizes experience or belief. I resort to the approach of Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca to argue that the debate about the existence of God carries no burden of proof, as well as no philosophical debate. To investigate why a burden of proof is attributed to the theist, I make a historical review and show that the hegemony of beliefs is the factor responsible for the impression that this burden exists. Since the current hegemony of naturalism is illegitimate and the proper basicality of belief in God is possible, I argue that the rejection of the evidentialist objection amounts to a shifting of the burden of proof. Finally, I present a strategy for defending theism based on three fronts.

This text begins with a ground-level diagnosis of the concrete condition of the southern cradle of civilization in diaspora as presented in the afro-pessimist philosophy of fundamental authors such as Frank B. Wilderson III, Hortense Spillers and Denise Ferreira da Silva. The concept of total violence of the latter appears in the text as the fact to be overcome in a glimpse of a possible theoretical alternative that escapes the certificate of social death measured by afro-pessimist philosophy. With this purpose, a practical-theoretical path is taken in returning to a philosophy prior to the violence of the clash with the nordic cradle of civilization, namely, zulu philosophy. This inspires a new therapeutic form created from the healing practices of the sangomas, the priestesses and masters of knowledge among their South African people. This practice, which I have called the zulu constellation - already successfully tested for more than four years in almost one hundred clinical sessions - creates the conditions for the legitimacy of a mature hope in the real chance of a free experience of the southern cradle of civilization. The clinical proposal also establishes the conditions for an political ontology whose tone responds effectively and consistently to afro-pessimism, pointing out that the current total violence experienced by the indigenous people, by the black people in the diaspora and by all non-human species can only be satisfactorily elucidated within organicity, in which the horror of fragmentation and consequent mortification of all organic systems are sufficiently elucidated under the concept of anti-life. Based on this understanding, the answer to total violence is revealed not by overcoming it through absolute combat, but by its dissolution with the fundamental effort of a policy of continuous integration - sometimes a starting point, sometimes an end point - of this violence in the processes endogenous to all organisms, as described by organicity.

This thesis aims to present and analyze the criticisms regarding Foucault's project of an aesthetics of existence as a form of aestheticism, such as the criticism made by Pierre Hadot who defines Foucault's philosophy as a new form of dandyism, a 20th century version. To address such criticisms, or at least put them into perspective, it is necessary to elucidate what is actually at stake in Foucault's project of an ethics of the self to resist power. This project cannot be fully understood in all its complexity except by outlining an entire path of philosophical thought, which, in turn, is constantly updated and which makes strategic use of certain concepts in order to reflect on philosophy itself and its limits. Therefore, we will analyze the movement of approximation and rejection that led the french philosopher and psychologist Michel Foucault to distance himself from the institutional philosophy in vogue at his time, with the aim of rethinking the concept of experience based on a supposed nietzschean inspiration. This desire for something other led the author to engender a monumental exercise of thought that we define here as an attempt to present the historical and concrete experience of sexuality with the aim of making explicit the network of devices that shape us as particular subjectivities. A detailed analysis of this exercise in outlining a history of experiences allows us to understand and justify the author's intention in seeking to articulate knowledge, power and subjectivity and, with this, to suggest the possibility of a life as a work of art based on an actualization of the old notion of the care of the self. However, as we intend to demonstrate, this movement does not bring the author closer to an egocentric narcissism, as he has been accused by some, and those who still today intend to accuse foucaultian philosophy of being a new form of dandyism in the 21st century must, first of all, better understand the philosophical dimension of dandyism itself.

The advances of modern logic, in part attributed to the German philosopher Gottlob Frege, allowed us to fully develop the intuitive notion of classical axiomatic into the rough and precise theoretical objects that are the formal axiomatic systems. However,the technical evolution of these constructions moved away from their basic elements, suchas theirown language,the metaphysicalgroundingthatwould guarantee the passage from the syntactic to the semantic.Nevertheless, Gödel's Incompleteness Theoremssuggest that there is a scope of the notion of truth that escapes and,hence, that cannot be captured only by the formal apparatus of axiomatic theories.Thisis an indication that formal systems can be seen as formalizations of concepts, and that this scope of meaning must play an important role in the foundation of these objects.Therefore,the present work is motivated by the investigation about this mismatch between the layer of meaning and the syntactic layer of formal systems. It is impossible to denythe importance and relevance of formal systems to a lot of areas, such as mathematics and computing, for instance; thus, it is, indeed, necessary the study that aims to understandbetterthe nature of these objects, going beyond of its instrumental and syntactic use.

This work proposes to examine the historical connection and the path of phenomenology from Brentano and Husserl to the philosophy of Jean Héring, as well as to understand the influence of nascent phenomenology in relation to religious experience, more specifically the nature and object of phenomena mental involved in this experience. This examination constitutes an investigation about the concept of intentionality as the guiding thread that weaves the philosophical thinking of these authors. This concept was reintroduced by Franz Brentano in the foundation of his psychology as a science, a proposal that arose from the departure from Kantian philosophy and positivism. The epistemology arising from this foundation becomes the principles of twentieth-century phenomenology. In this wake of philosophical thinking, Jean Héring (1890-1966), a  tudent of Husserl in Göttingen, applied the principles and concepts of phenomenology in his analysis of religious experience in order to distinguish and delimit the field of religious philosophy in view of fundamentally it as a no less important knowledge compared to those influenced by positivism, by psychologism. Consequently, he set out to describe and elucidate the nature and object of the religious sphere as a sui generis experience by presenting the criteria and authenticity of that experience due to the help of phenomenology.

The Edith Stein’s work “The structure of the human person” aims to ground the pedagogy on an anthropological philosophy. This is why this dissertation begins with the question “What is the man?” and then advances to “How we must form him?”. Actually, this last question cannot be answered without the first. Guided by the phenomenological method and the thomistic philosophy, Stein describes the human person as a unity of body, soul and spirit. As we investigate each one of these dimensions, we will understand the specificity of the human person and the specificity of his formation in relation to the others “realms of being” – material, vegetable, animal and purely spiritual. Finally, we will also verify the necessity to consider, in our anthropological investigation, the social dimension of the human person, as well as to welcome the christian revelation as a necessary complement and guide for anthropology and for pedagogy. Indeed, for Stein, both depend on a supernatural source of knowledges, without which it is not possible to understand the first origin, the profound essence and the ultimate mission of the human person.

Existential Psychoanalysis is one of the last subjects addressed in the work Being and Nothingness (1943) by philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre. Despite the clear Freudian inspiration, Sartre will propose an interpretation of human behavior based on an ontophenomenological foundation of man and the world. This paper will try to present the close ties between the French philosopher and the German Edmund Husserl (1859- 1938), explaining how Sartre absorbed the phenomenological ideas and what is the scope of these ideas within his philosophy. We will expose the author's main philosophical notions that sustain his psychoanalytic proposal, making some references to Freudian psychoanalysis, but with the intention of highlighting the originality of Sartre's notion of consciousness built throughout his works. We will also establish an interlocution with Georges Politzer in order to find similarities between Sartre's proposal and the critical movement made by the thinker in relation to the theoretical canons of the field of psychology. In this way, we intend to locate the existentialist philosopher among those intellectuals who tried to reorient the paradigms of human sciences based on the existentialist works. Therefore, the purpose of this dissertation is to understand what implications the Sartrian conception of consciousness can have in the field of human sciences and how Sartrian existentialism can be useful in the understanding of society and contemporary human beings.

The concept of teleology is paramount to our understanding of Aristotle’s Natural Philosophy. For him, natural processes are end-oriented: they occur for the sake of some end. A passage in Politics I 8 (1256b15-22) is often referred to as evidence for the apparently anthropocentric nature of his teleological views: plants are for the sake of animal food and non-human animals are for the sake of human food and human conveniences. I tried to show that Aristotle’s notion of teleology is more nuanced and sophisticated than what a superficial reading of this passage may seem to support. I argued that (i) the notion of ‘cause’ must be understood not only within the modern framework of causation laws, but also within the broader context of explanations; and
that (ii) for Aristotle, there are two kinds of ‘ends’ (or ‘that for the sake of which’): the end as an objective and the end as a beneficiary.

The Master’s thesis treats Immanuel Kant's concept of empirical reality. The first part deals with the problem of defining reality, what it really is. The Danish-Swiss philosophers Anton Hügli and Poul Lübcke propose a classification of reality viewed from different aspects and show how difficult it is to define what reality actually is. Immanuel Kant dialogues with each of their definitions, as he has several comments on what Hügli and Lübcke have to say about reality. Empirical and objective reality is presented in the next segment, followed by the presentation of the concepts of Realität and Wirklichkeit. They are somewhat problematic from a linguistic point of view, as they are two different concepts in German, but in other languages they are translated by the same word. In the section on Transcendental Idealism, space and time and their role as

forms of pure intuitions are presented, as well as their important part as preconditions for reality. The next part deals with the problem of empirical realism, probably the most complicated part of the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant is known for having detected his own form of categories, which differ from those developed by Aristotle. While Aristotle's categories are a form of being, Kant's are necessary for thinking and cognition. But the categories cannot exist on their own to make reality recognisable. They need to be schematised and then applied in space and time to provide cognition about the (external) world and reality in which the subject lives. This is followed by the question of what the "real" is and what role the axioms of intuition and the anticipation of perception play in answering this question

In this study, we look for the main philosophical sources that inspire Saint Augustine (354-430) in his Letter 7. Written between the years 388 and 391, Letter 7 belongs to the same intellectual period that we find, for example, in De Musica (387-391), De Magistro (389) and De Vera Religione (390/391). Letter 7 stands out, in the vast Augustinian corpus, as one of the most relevant texts for the study of the issue of memory, a study that will reach its most complete development in book X of the Confessiones (397-401) and in the last books of De Trinitate (399-419). One of the most fundamental questions in Augustinian thought, memory implies many others, as we can see in Letter 7. Among other, we find: reminiscence and the preexistence of the soul, time and eternity, the sensation and divine illumination, and, mainly, imagination (phantasia/imaginatio). As far as sources are concerning, as these topics are presented in Letter 7, we seek to find, understand and demonstrate their main philosophical influences. For instance, Plato (427-347) is nominally present in Letter 7; Aristotle (384-322) can be seen both in Nebridius, the keen author of the questions that evoke Letter 7, and in Augustine; the Stoics (3rd century BC to 2nd century AD), usually via Cicero (106-43), also appear on the basis of some conceptual distinctions; and Plotinus (205-270) and Porphyry (c. 232-305) are the most prominent names among Augustine’s philosophical sources. Thus, if the work with the sources is significant to better understand the issues exposed in Letter 7, it is also significant, perhaps even more so, to perceive the way Augustine takes these sources as, not rarely, we point out, that since Letter 7 he uses them with great originality.

William Alston¹ defends the idea that mystical experiences reinforce the belief in God in theistic religions and that religious beliefs are formed from mystical doxastic practices, that is, practices that form religious beliefs, such as tradition, the reading of scriptures, the testimony of important protagonists in the history of religions and accounts of mystical interaction experiences with God, among other practices. In this sense, the existence of diverse, socially established religions, with their doxastic practices and diverse beliefs pose challenges to the idea of an ultimate and true reality, since they always refer to characteristics of the sacred entity in the way it is described in the religious tradition in which the believer is inserted.

The existence in the world of a plurality of religions inserted in diverse cultural and religious contexts, with varied characterizations of objects of worship, poses a problem for Alston's thesis: how is it possible that religious beliefs formed from doxastic practices and concepts of ultimate reality incompatible in the various socially established religious communities are maintained by their respective believers as prima facie justified, although conflicting with those believed by believers of other religious hues; and further, to what degree this problem would compromise the thesis that religious belief finds reinforcement in mystical experience.

Alston lists some possible solutions to the problem of religious diversity, among which we highlight:

1. Maintain the attitude of epistemic conservatism toward the belief-forming practices of the various religious communities.

2. Accept the hypothesis of Kantian inspiration with cultural content proposed by (Hick, 2018).

3. Adhering to the radical naturalistic hypothesis.

The objective of this thesis is to analyze the relevance of each of the alternatives referred by Alston to deal with the problem in question.

In John Rawls’ Law of Peoples, tolerance has the important role of enabling the conditions for the construction of a stable and peaceful international order. Liberal peoples must, based on the principles of the Law of Peoples, follow a tolerant foreign policy towards peoples who demonstrate themselves to be decent. Liberal tolerance towards these peoples is expressed, initially, in a vertical perspective and, later, in a horizontal perspective, that is, as respect among peoples who recognize each other as equals. Respect for urgent human rights is one of the requirements of the criteria of decency established by liberal peoples that is imposed on all societies, pointing out the limits of liberal tolerance. Due to their commitment to tolerance, which implies respect for the diversity of peoples, liberal peoples should not impose their conception of justice on other peoples, as this undermines the autonomy of well-ordered peoples. As a consequence, the Law of Peoples does not accept principles of global distribution and proposes the duty of assistance with a target and cut-off point, moving away from a conception of global justice. The duty of assistance is an important measure for tackling poverty in burdened societies. However, if the existence of a basic global structure is considered, it is not sufficient to dispense with principles of global justice that promote the distribution of wealth among peoples, as such a structure generates economic interdependence, weakening the Rawlsian argument of peoples’ responsibility for their choices. The Law of Peoples completes John Rawls’ theory of justice developed in the works A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism, and extends to the Society of Peoples the liberal conception of justice formulated for liberal domestic societies, but such an extension does not imply the reproduction of the principles of this conception of justice in a conception of global justice.

The present doctoral Thesis in Philosophy endouvered the investigation of the idea of real political action and its necessary historical conditions for the political acting in Antonio Gramsci. The problematic present to the Thesis is: Which are the gramscian philosophical requirements for the real political action in the philosophy of praxis? The main objective was to show that those requirements allready have been given by history, leaving up to political philosophy taking over the educational task of formation in the masses of the class consciousness and therefore prepare them to overcame the antagonism burgoisie x proletariat. To come to that matter, the Thesis was structured in three chapters as follows. 1) Starting point: political and philosophical pathway, where to show that since his juvenil maturity the reflections about the philosphy of praxis are present. 2) Spontaneity and conscious direction in politics, space granted to anlyse three funding points of gramscian thought: the ideia that every human is a philosopher; that the conscious direction can be preceded by sponteneity; translatability as task sine qua non for the political action to be effective and for the philosophy of praxis to become concrete. 3) Political path to the formation of the New State, when the route is traced among the philosophy of praxis, materialism, and the relation of forces. It was verified, therefore, that the so long awaited revolution demands a long and continous formative process of the masses, whose historical conditions allready have been given by history, leaving up to the worker to unite in order to form a new hegemony in its favor, a new State.

This dissertation intends to investigate the articulation between philosophy and politics within the main works of Hannah Arendt.

Considering that these two disciplines are always in tension or opposition-especially from the perspective of the tradition of philosophical thought, starting with Plato -, the main objective lies in determining whether, based on Arendt's thought, there is any possibility of mediation between them, that is, a conciliation between the faculties of thought and action. In order to achieve thisobjective,a monographic and exegetical approach was chosen,focusing on the relationship between the texts and their historical-philosophical premises, developed towards a critical analysis of the concepts discussed by the author. In other words, the present investigation prioritized, on the one hand, the rigorous exposition of Arendtian theory and, on the other hand, it endeavored to conceive connections between philosophy and politics. To summarize, the first chapter comprises the historical-philosophical investigation of the main events that took place in modernity that, according to Arendt, anticipate and drive the totalitarian experiences of the 20th century. The task consists, at first, in showing, above all, the exhaustion of critical thinking in favor of technical - mathematical knowledge.

Secondly, the present work proposes to relate the emergence of the mass individual with this inability to think-something that will lead to the development, in particular, of the concept ofbanality of evil. Finally, the task will consist of elaborating a hypothesis about the relationship between philosophy and politics, thought and action, and this based on twoparadigms: the first considering Socrates as a model of philosopher and citizen; and the second, taking as inspiration the Kantian guidelines for reformulating the concepts of thought and judgment. The broader purpose is, therefore, to try to indicate analternative for the mediation between these categories,which, according to Arendt, have always been in conflict throughout the tradition of Western political thought.

The concept of constructiveness is often debated in the fields of foundations and philosophy of Mathematics. This work is an attempt to define and analize different approaches to this concept in the context of classical and intuitionistic Mathematics. To do so, we define two approaches, the tradicional and the relative production of sets, and we analyze them in the context of the classical set theory ZFC and the intuitionistic set theories IZF and CZF. We argue that the tradicional approach, defined based on the common use of the term con- structiveness in the context of mathematical practice, is not appropriate to classical theories due to its instability by logical equivalence. In other words, constructive sentences are equiv- alent to non-constructive ones. For intuitionistic theories, which aim to be construtive, we argue that the approach is also not appropriate due to the fact that these theories contain non-constructive sentences according to this approach. The relative production of sets approach does have estability by local equivalence and it is adequate to discuss the constructiveness of sentences. However, its definition is only applicable
to the classical set theory ZFC. We finalize this work with a proposal of an adaptation to the relative production of sets approach that make it applicable to intuitionistic set theories: the minimal models approach.

This work intends to discuss the elements that make up the fundamental lines of the proposal of a cosmopolitanlaw (Weltbürgerrecht) by ImmanuelKant. Introduced in the work Perpetual peace(1795), cosmopolitan lawis define dasarightof hospitality (Hospitalitätsrecht), by which is meant the right of a foreigner not to be treated with hostility because of his arrival in another’s land. The purpose of cosmopolitan law would ultimately
betoregulatetheinteractionbetweenindividualsandstatesincertainsituationsof
interaction. Such conception drove the present investigation in order to try to understandwhy Kant considers as essential that the legal relations between states and foreign individuals be gathered undera singleand comprehensivelegalframework, thatis, gatheredunder cosmopolitan law. In view of this, the dissertation investigates what thespecificityof cosmopolitan law is in the general framework of the formal requirements and conditions of possibility for the proscription of war and the establishment of a state of world peace founded on law. In this respect, it is understood, first, that its specificity consists in regulating interactions between individuals and states in precise situations in which they are not contemplated by the civil law of the state and the international law; second, it is understood that cosmopolitan law represents the legal principle that, by giving rise to the legal figure of worldcitizenship (inadditiontonationalcitizenship), establishes aguiding principle according to which action – whether within a national community of law or an international community of law – must be assessed from the perspective ofpluralism, that is, from the perspective ofwhat is best for the whole world(V-Anth/Mensch, AA 25)rather than what is best for a single person, people or state.

The thesis begins to be drawn from a nuisance: the world as we know it continues to be directed towards environmental, social, and ethical cataclysms. Unfortunately, these assertions are neither moral nor questionable. That is what there is, despite the existence of a community, cultural and economic movements that seek to survive the end of the world. The solutions that we see designed at the most question the need for the end of capitalism, almost always without considering what some theorists have pointed out in different ways: capitalism has a tremendous revolutionary and reifying force in its processes – to which Silvia Federici would add, almost always reactionary. Thus, not only is the world heading towards endless extractability, of natural resources and epistemic resources, but it is also heading towards an increasingly proletarianized, surrounded, and machined existence for the majority of the planet’s inhabitants. When investigating the presuppositions of the modern text, mainly philosophical, as suggested by Denise Ferreira da Silva, I tried to understand what, in ontoepistemological terms, allows the permanence of the world as we know it. This happens given the scenario described, and from the understanding that it is still necessary and always possible to (r)exist – however, not preventing the end of this world, but, on the contrary, contributing to its end (da Silva). I understand, as the authors mobilized in this text – such as the Martinican Édouard Glissant, the AfricanAmerican Saidiya Hartman, and da Silva herself –, the fact that the racial arsenal gestated in modernity is what should end for this world to end. In this sense, the thesis investigates the constitution of otherness in the so-called “modern text”, as well as presents some contemporary discussions that sought to produce thought from what Walter Mignolo called the “colonial difference”. Starting from the diagnosis of the constitution of the transparent self (the constitution of the subject in the postEnlightenment) in da Silva and from the prerogative set by Glissant regarding opacity, I try to draw what would be the end of the racial arsenal and the end of this world from that what is left: the ghosts, the traces, and the specters. For not constituting full presences –“presence” as another name of metaphysics –, for refusing to reify the extractability proclaimed by the modern text, for not inscribing through essentialisms in the philosophical and political thought of transparency, as well as its concomitant emancipatory projects civilizations and those present in contemporary religious fundamentalisms, they are the memories, the traces, the inscriptions that will enable the irruption of the real. The (po)ethics is the formal and material modus with which we deal with the refusal of transparency and reaffirm the right to opacity (Glissant) as the only possible way of being in the world. Thus, the text is an attempt to find – also along with contemporary philosophical-feminist literature – what is left over and what will constitute our new world since the end of raciality.